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Abstract
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Policy Research Working Paper 5809
This paper examines the key aspects of the practices of 
school-based management in Indonesia, and its effect 
on education quality. Using a conceptual framework of 
an accountability system of public service delivery, the 
paper explores the relations among Indonesian parents, 
school committees, schools, and government education 
supervisory bodies from three tenets: participation and 
voice; autonomy; and accountability. 
   Using the data from a nationally representative survey 
of about 400 public primary schools in Indonesia, 
the paper finds that the level of parental participation 
and voice in school management is extremely low in 
Indonesia. While the role of school committees is still 
limited to community relations, school facilities, and 
other administrative areas of school management, 
school principals, together with teachers, are much 
more empowered to assert professional control of 
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Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. 
Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted 
at dchen1@worldbank.org.  
the schools. The accountability system has remained 
weak in Indonesia’s school system, which is reflected 
by inadequate information flow to parents, as well as 
seemingly low parental awareness of the need to hold 
schools accountable. The accountability arrangement 
of the Indonesian school system currently puts more 
emphasis on top-down supervision and monitoring by 
government supervisory bodies. 
   The findings show that although the scope of school-
based management in Indonesia is limited, it has begun 
to help schools make the right decisions on allocation 
of resources and hiring additional (non-civil servant) 
teachers, and to create an enabling environment of 
learning, including increasing teacher attendance rates. 
These aspects are found to have significantly positive 
effects on student learning outcomes.  
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I. Introduction and conceptual framework 
  Governments  around  the  world  are  introducing  a  range  of  strategies  aimed  at 
improving  the  delivery  of  education  services.    One  such  strategy  is  to  decentralize 
education decision making by increasing parental and community involvement in schools, 
which is commonly known as school-based management (SBM).  The argument in favor 
of  SBM  is  that  decentralizing  decision-making  authority  to  parents  and  communities 
fosters demand and ensures that schools provide the social and economic benefits that 
best reflect the priorities and values of those local communities.  An increasing number 
of developing countries are implementing SBM reforms aimed at empowering principals, 
teachers, and parents, or at strengthening their motivation, thereby enhancing their sense 
of ownership of the school. Many of these reforms have led to greater involvement of 
communities and parents and, in turn, have had a direct influence on educational quality. 
In particular, it has been found that increased participation, autonomy, and accountability 
are the three most important changes associated with improved quality of education and 
better learning outcomes.  
The 2004 World Development Report (WDR) ―Making Services Work for Poor 
People‖ (World Bank 2003) provides a conceptual framework for this phenomenon. The 
framework is presented as a three-cornered relationship between citizens, politicians, and 
service providers.  The service provision and accountability relationships between these 
actors is complex, as even within each group of actors there are usually heterogeneous 
sub-groups, and the incentives and accountability relationships that work for one group 
may be different from those that work for other groups. When accountability fails, the 
failure  can  be  tracked  either  to  the  long  route  between  providers  and  users  through 
policymakers,  or  to  the  short  route  between  service  providers  and  users  directly. 
Sometimes improving the long route is a long-term process and, in some situations, may 
not  be  doable.  In  these  cases,  the  WDR  2004 suggests  strengthening  the  short  route 
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Figure 1: An Accountability Framework 
Source: World Bank (2003). 
SBM  is  a  direct  reflection  of  this  ―short-route‖  approach.  What  successful 
education  systems  share  appears  to  be  a  working  structure  of  accountability:  clear 
objectives,  adequate  resources,  and  capable  and  motivated  providers.  Institutional 
reforms should aim at strengthening the system of accountability, not only relying on the 
improvement of some proximate determinants  of success,  such as  curriculum design, 
pedagogical  methods,  textbooks,  teacher  training,  school  construction,  or  new 
information technologies.  
The  2004  WDR  presented  evidence  that  increasing  school  autonomy  and 
accountability  can  help  solve  some  of  the  most  fundamental  problems  in  education. 
According to existing evidence, while increasing resource flows and other support to the 
education sector is necessary, it is also critical to translate these resources into basic 
services that can reach the clients. Schools should be given some autonomy in using their 
inputs  and  be  held  accountable  to  the  users  for  using  these  inputs  efficiently.  The 
literature that promotes the use of SBM generally points to three tenets for improving 
service  delivery:  (i)  increasing  client  choice  and  participation  (―voice‖);  (ii)  building 
effective  and  autonomous  frontline  providers  and  organizations  (―management‖);  and 
(iii) making information widely available, and using the information to strengthen the   4 
rewards  for  delivering  effective  services  and  penalize  those  who  fail  to  deliver 
(―compact‖). 
  The  worldwide  evidence  on  school-based  management  is  well  summarized  in 
―Decentralized Decision-Making in Schools‖ (World Bank, 2009).  The general finding is 
that SBM shows positive results on mainly reducing grade repetition and failure, and 
improving teacher attendance rates, contrasted with the mixed results in test scores.   
 
II. Indonesian context 
Indonesia is a very large country geographically, with more than 200,000 schools 
nationwide.  Decentralizing service delivery is a natural response to concerns about the 
ability of central policymakers to respond to the needs of a large and diverse country. 
Since  2002,  Indonesia  has  sought  to  address  structural  problems  in  the  legal  and 
legislative  framework  governing  education  service  delivery.    The  government  has 
formalized first SBM-principles with Decree No. 044/U/2002 (Ministry of Education, 
2002) on the Education Board and School Committees (SC). The Decree defined the 
school  committee  as  the  community  representative  body  at  the  school  level  with 
membership  comprising  parents,  community  leaders,  education  professionals,  private 
sector, education associations, teachers, NGOs and village officials. It must comprise a 
minimum of nine members and the chairperson must come from outside the school.  
The idea of the school committee is based on the enlargement of the old style BP3 
(Parents-Teachers Association) and aimed at accommodating wider participation from 
the  parents  and  the  community,  empowering  them  in  decision  making,  and  holding 
schools accountable so as to improve education access and quality on the ground. The 
expectation was that SBM would lead to more efficient use of resources and improved 
student achievement. The Decree explicitly stipulates that SC objectives should include: 
(1) to accommodate aspirations of the community on operational policies and education 
sector programs at the education unit (school level); (2) to encourage more community 
roles in education provision at the school level; and (3) to facilitate the establishment of 
education service provision at the school level in a transparent and accountable manner. 
Education  Law  No.  20/2003  also  defines  the  District  Education  Board  as  an 
independent body representing civil society at the district level with the aim of improving   5 
education service delivery.  The committee supports this improvement by: (1) providing 
advice to assist in determining the school program and policy; (2) providing support such 
as financial support, ideas, and activities for the implementation of the school program; 
(3) providing control over school programs for transparency and accountability; and (4) 
providing mediation and communication between the school and the community.   
Compared to international practices particularly in Latin America, the practice of 
SBM in Indonesian is very much limited in public schools. The majority of the teachers 
are public civil servants, whom the schools have no power to hire or fire.  In theory, 
schools  have  only  control  over  non-salary  operational  expenditures,  even  though  the 
discretionary resources are commonly used to hire additional contract teachers.  
International partners have supported SBM in Indonesia for more than 10 years. 
The Ministry of National Education (MoNE) has even established a SBM Secretariat to 
integrate programs.  The donor programs that can be broadly categorized as supporting 
SBM include:  Creating Learning Communities for Children (CLCC) with UNICEF and 
UNESCO;  Decentralized  Basic  Education  Project  (DBEP)  with  Asian  Development 
Bank; Regional Education Development and Improvement Program (REDIP) with JICA; 
Managing Basic Education and Decentralized Basic Education (DBE) with USAID; and 
Australia Indonesia Basic Education Program (AIBEP) with AusAID.  
There  is  a  small  but  growing  research  literature  devoted  to  school-based 
management  in  Indonesia.    The  evidence  on  school  committees  is  based  mainly  on 
qualitative case studies across a range of provinces. The SMERU Institute studies from 
2005 and 2008 focused on school committee participation in school management, as well 
as  the  school  budgeting  process  that  accompanies  receiving  the  BOS  block  grants 
(RAPBS). They found school committees were often dominated by school principals, 
with the help of selected teachers. Committees generally concentrated in raising funds for 
the  school  to  use  on  facilities,  and  rarely  entered  into  areas  related  to  teaching  and 
learning. Participation within the committees was limited, and often dominated by the 
committee leader, who may be a respected figure in the community (such as a former 
school  principal).  However,  these  committees  were  seen  as  potentially  effective 
communicators of complaints from parents about actions within the school, including 
disciplinary episodes.    6 
A number of factors appear to contribute to the relatively weak position of the 
school committee vis-à-vis school personnel, especially the principal. The first is that 
committees are not perceived as having relevant expertise for entering into questions 
related  to  management,  teaching  and  learning.  Another  factor  was  referred  to  as  an 
institutional legitimacy issue, since the school principal receives his/her decree from the 
district  office,  while  the  school  committee  is  appointed  locally.  Finally,  with  the 
introduction of the ―School Operational Assistance‖
2 (Batuan Operasional Sekolah, BOS) 
grants, one of the main historical functions of the school committees—raising funds—has 
been reduced in importance (SMERU, 2005, 2008). 
The school’s use of the BOS grant money is another area of research. The main 
benefit from the program appears to be the supplanting of school-based fees, at least in 
rural areas (SMERU, 2008). This does not mean that local fees have been abolished, but 
the additional funds appear to be used to purchase the materials and inputs that were 
financed  largely  by  parental  fees  before.  This  in  turn  has  positive  implications  for 
participation, since the price of school has in effect been lowered. 
As for how schools use the grant money, the evidence is mixed. As mentioned in 
Sweeting  et  al.  (2003-07),  on  the  one  hand  there  are  instances  of  qualitative 
improvements,  for  example,  through  enhanced  teacher  training.  But  the  evidence 
suggests a general emphasis on materials and physical infrastructure, rather than learning 
processes. Also, not every community has necessarily welcomed the BOS program. In 
some urban areas there is evidence of schools declining BOS in favor of maintaining a 
school fee system that generates more resources, although this puts more pressure on the 
poorest families. In other areas there are concerns about district-level diverting of the 
funds. Finally, there is the concern raised above that one side effect of the BOS program 
is that it indirectly weakens the position of the school committee given its historical role 




                                                 
2 Capitation grant to primary and junior secondary schools started in 2005, currently in the amount of about 
US$ 40 per pupil at primary level, and approximately US$ 60 at junior secondary level.    7 
III.  The SBM survey 2010 and a brief overview of the status of SBM in Indonesia  
  In April 2010, the World Bank, in collaboration with the RAND Corporation and 
Survey Meter, carried out a sample survey of 400 public primary schools
3 in Indonesia 
spreading over 54 districts. Interviews were carried out with 400 principals, 781 school 
committee members, 1,953 teachers, and 2,400 parents.  In addition, 54 heads of  district 
(Kabupaten)  or  municipality  (Kota)  education  offices,  47  heads  of  sub-district 
(Kecamaten) education offices, 52 chairs of the district education board, and 54 of chief 
school inspectors in each district were also interviewed. Selected Grade 5 pupils in each 
surveyed school were tested in Indonesian language and mathematics
4.   
Figure 2:  Distribution of 54 sampled districts 
 
Consistent with national data, the average size of the sampled primary school is 
small, at 180 students on average per school.  The student-teacher ratio is generally low,   
around 15:1.  Schools’ discretionary resource envelopes, excluding public civil service 
teachers’ salaries that are directly paid to teachers, is also in general small, but varies 
from region to region.   
The  survey  aims  at  capturing  the  current  practice  of  SBM  in  Indonesia,  after 
nearly 10 years of its principles written into law. The survey has shown that in general 
the scope of SBM continues to be very limited in Indonesian public primary schools.  In 
terms  of  the  first  key  tenet  of  SBM  -  parental  choice,  participation,  and  voice,  90% 
                                                 
3 These are the public primary schools under the auspices of the Ministry of National Education, 
comprising about 90 percent of total primary schools in Indonesia.  The other 10% mostly include private 
schools and the schools under the Ministry of Religious Affairs (mostly private schools).  
4 The survey also included 54 public junior secondary schools, one in each sampled district.  This paper 
focuses on the 400 public primary schools only.   8 
surveyed parents did not actively choose schools, even though nearly 70% do have other 
choices in the same village (Figure 3).  
Figure 3: Parental choice of schools 
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other schools
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Is the school the only school in 
village?
 
Source: SBM Survey 2010, World Bank. 
  Parental involvement in school affairs tends to be low.  The limited involvement 
is mainly interactions with teachers or principals on issues related to their own children, 
or attending regular parents’ meetings with schools. Over 80% of the parents have neither 
provided any inputs to school, nor volunteered in school activities, such as serving as a 
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never once multiple times
 
School management and autonomy is the second tenet of SBM.  Even though 
Indonesia cancelled the school/university autonomy law in early 2010, the survey shows 
that in practice, school principals continue enjoying much freedom of decision-making at 
schools.  They  generally  feel  much  empowered  in  influencing  various  aspects  of 
educational  management:  student  admission;  school  timetable;  budget  and  planning; 
managing teachers; school facilities as well as teaching and learning materials including 
curriculum  contents.    They  appear  to  have  both  ―administrative  control‖  and 
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During this school year (2009-2010), as principal how influential are you over the 
following aspects of your school? 
1. not influential 2. little influential 3. quite influential 4. much influential
 
In comparison, school committees largely feel less control of school decision-
making.  School committees report that their most influential area is community-school 
relations, following by planning for school facility improvement.  Around half of the 
school committees in the survey responded that they had little or no influence on school 
vision and mission, budget allocation and work plan.    
 










































During this school year (2009-2010), how influential is SC over the following aspects of the school?
not influential 2.little influential 3.quite influential 4. much influential
 
The  least  influenced  areas  by  school  committees  fall  under  the  ―professional 
control‖ side of the school: textbooks choice, school calendar, curriculum, and teacher 
management.     11 
The dichotomy of principal vs. school committee on school management is to 
some extent understandable within the institutional context.  With the ownership of the 
Indonesian public schools still falls under the government, and generally categorized as 
―technical unit‖ in the government structure with assigned budget headings, the principal, 
as an appointed government employee, is responsible for this ―unit‖ and allocated public 
budget. With increased share of public funding at school level in recent years, it is natural 
to expect that the principal’s role is likely to be enlarged.   
The  third  tenet  of  SBM  is  transparency  and  accountability.    Regarding 
information flow from schools to parents, the report card on individual child’s academic 
performance,  mostly  semester  test  results,  is  regularly  sent  to  parents,  and  they  are 
generally easy for parents to understand (Figure 7).   
 


























How understandable is report card
 
Beyond  report  cards  on  students’  performance  at  school,  other  information 
regarding school activities and management is not commonly communicated to parents.  
Only about 20% of the parents surveyed responded that they received some information 
on overall school performance
5. Similarly quite low share of parents  reported that they 
learned  anything  about  school  finance  or  were  encouraged  to  volunteer  in  school 
activities.  Only half of the parents interviewed actually received any information about 




                                                 
5 This is not well defined, a weakness of the survey.    12 
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Overall, how satisfied are 
you with  The management 
of this school
Overall, how satisfied are 
you with  The quality of 
education at this school
Overall, how satisfied are 








Paradoxically,  with  little  interaction  with  schools,  and  infrequent  information 
supplied by schools, a large majority of parents are either satisfied or very satisfied with 
school quality, management, and their children’s teachers (Figure 8, right panel). This 
appears to cast doubt on whether the accountability of schools to parents would work in 
Indonesia, where community harmony is highly valued, and a majority of parents are 
reserved and do not openly complain or express dissatisfaction.   
This doubt is somewhat verified by the responses of schools and districts on the 
pressure  they  felt  for  improving  education  quality.    Of  those  surveyed,  68%  of  the 
principals and 63% of the district education officers responded that there was little to no 
pressure from parents to improve education.  The school committees, district education 
boards  (DEB),  and  school  inspectors  seem  to  view  the  pressure  as  slightly  higher.  
However, they are in general on the ―giving‖ end, but not the ―receiving‖ end of the 
pressure, and thus may have biased views on the pressure that parents actually put on 
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Figure 9: Pressure from parents to improve student performance: viewed by 
various stakeholders 
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strong to very strong no to weak pressure
 
The bottom-up pressure from parents seems weak in Indonesia’s public primary 
schools, but the top-down pressure from government supervisory bodies is slightly more 
significant.  Figure 10 shows that schools are frequently visited by school inspectors from 
the district education office.  Schools on average receive nearly 6 visits by the district 
school inspectors per  year.  This is somewhat  verified by the district’s response that 
quarterly and monthly school visits are common by the districts. 
 

















Since the beginning of this school year (2009-
2010), how many times have schools received 
























Frequency of district visiting schools
(Reported by District education  officer)
 
What happened during and after the district’s visit to schools? Even though the 
visits are frequent, it seems that the key aspects of quality assurance and consequences 
are missing from these visits.  For example, monitoring instruction inside classrooms is 
not commonly covered during these visits, and reviewing the school budget is also not a   14 
routine task of the supervisors.  This leads to the question of what the feedback given to 
principals and teachers  is mostly based on, or whether the evaluations and feedback, 
together with other inspection areas (i.e. school facility and administrative procedures) 
are superficial.   
In addition, the consequences for poor performance rarely lead to any high-stake 
actions.  The most common measure taken for a low-performing principal is a transfer to 
another school or placement with a mentor.  Demotion and firing would only happen with 
more serious offenses (Figure 11). 



































Purpose of Dinas visit 
(reported by Dinas)





























Whether measures are taken by Dinas for principal low 
performance (reported by Dinas)
1.Yes 3.No
 
In brief, Indonesia has joined the global trend of decentralization of educational 
decision-making.    Schools  are  empowered  to  make  decisions  on  administrative  and 
technical matters.  However, Indonesia does not seem to get the best from the current 
SBM practice.  The level of parental participation, transparency, and accountability needs 
to be elevated to enable the country to reap the full benefit of SBM in improving the 
quality of education.  
 
IV. Estimating the effects of school decision-making 
  This  section  provides  empirical  evidence  on  whether  school  level  decision-
making actually leads to improved education outcomes in Indonesia.  The scope of school 
decision-making in the country is still limited, given that a majority of teachers are civil 
servants, who are assigned to schools.  Therefore decision-making at the school level is 
limited to its relatively small discretionary resource envelope.  But there are key areas in 
which schools can and have been making choices.  We look into two of these areas:   15 
hiring non-civil servant (contract) teachers, and allocating discretionary resources.  We 
examine what factors are associated with school choices, and how these choices affect 
student learning outcomes at the school level.  
  We follow an analytical framework as graphed in Figure 12.  As depicted, school 
outcome is determined by three sets of factors: the school’s capacity to deliver results; the 
school’s  drive  and  actions  for  results;  as  well  as  students’  family  and  community 
background.  The school’s drive and actions for results are of particular interest in the 
context of SBM: they are affected by how much autonomy schools have, together with 
the extent to which schools are held accountable for their results.  
 
Figure 12: An analytical framework of school outcome 
 
Source: Author compilation. 
 
Schools  can  be  held  accountable  by  parents  and  communities  (bottom-up 
accountability), as well by government supervisory bodies (top-down accountability). In 
Indonesia, the former is often regarded as through the school committee, and the latter, 
the district education office.   
The approach for empirical estimation is summarized in Table 1.    16 
Table 1: Empirical approach to estimate school decision-making and its effects on 
school results 
  Equations 
  (1) 
Outcome equation 
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School level:      
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Government level :     
    Report requirement  
    Meetings and visits  
    Rewards and sanctions  
Community level:     
    Report to parents and 
communities on results  
    Multiple schools to choose 
from  
    Pressures to schools 
Direct participation in 
school mgmt  
  Parental resources 
parental education  
 
   
A  two-step  procedure  is  used  to  address  the  endogeneity  of  school  decision 
variables when explaining the school outcome.  As summarized in Table 1, the first step   17 
estimates school decision equations of (1) school budget allocation for student activities, 
particularly in support of learning such as remedial learning activities; and (2) the number 
of non-civil service (―non-PNS‖) teachers hired by schools.  We also include in the first 
step the estimation of one important intermediate outcome measure: teacher attendance 
rate. The predicted values of the first step dependent variables will serve as key variables 
to explain the school outcome: test scores of Indonesian language and math. 
  While school capacity variables such as principal and teachers’ qualification and 
experiences  enter  both  equations,  the  ―accountability‖  variables  only  affect  school 
outcomes through influencing school decision-making, and thus they are excluded from 
the 2
nd step estimation.  In the meantime, parental educational background and resources 
are regarded as only affecting learning outcome directly.  This is a reasonable assumption 
as  highly  educated  or  well-heeled  parents  can  only  be  highly  influential  if  they  are 
involved in school activities in the first place. The descriptive statistics of the variables 
used in the estimation are presented in Annex 1. 
The sample includes 383 schools. 13 schools in the survey actually responded that 
they  do  not  have  school  committees,  and  thus  are  excluded  from  the  sample.  Using 
discretionary  funding  for  hiring  non-civil  service  teachers  seems  to  be  a  common 
phenomenon, even though the student-teacher ratio is very low at average of 15:1 for the 
sample.  On average, 30% of the teachers in the surveyed schools are non-civil service 
teachers (Figure 13). 
Figure 13: STR and share of non-civil service teachers 
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   18 
Teacher  absenteeism  has  been  an  issue  in  Indonesia.  Chaudhury  et  al  (2006) 
reported that 19% of Indonesian teachers were absent from work.  Our survey relies on 
the principal’s estimate, and has a much better record of 6% absence rate.  However, the 
variations remain large from school to school.   
We use the average test scores for Indonesian language and math to measure the 
school outcome.  The test is administered to the Grade 5 students in surveyed schools, 
and designed based on the core curriculum requirements.  Students generally fair better in 
language than in math.  Language test score also shows smaller standard deviation than 
math score.   
 
Figure 14: Distribution of Indonesian language and math test score 









































The results of first step estimates are presented in Table 2
6.  For schools’ direct 
spending on student activities, in addition to the significant effect of schools’ total budget 
and  total  enrollment,  the  result  shows  that  the  amount  of  spending  is  significantly 
affected by the influence of districts or subdistricts.  Schools that reported districts/sub-
district  as  ―very  influential‖  over  schools  ―planning  and  budget  allocation‖  allocated 
more funds directly to support student activities.  In addition, schools that send parents 
information on BOS spending also spend more on their students directly.  Schools with a 
committee chair with at least senior secondary education also tend to spend more on 
                                                 
6 Full results in Annex 2.   19 
students.  Somewhat  consistent  with  the  effect  of  the  district/subdistrict’s  influence, 
schools with  more teachers trained  at  the district  level  during the previous  year also 
allocate greater spending on students.  
The district/subdistrict’s influence is also shown in the school’s decision to hire 
non-civil service teachers.  It seems that when there is more influence of districts on 
schools’  ―professional‖  aspect  (i.e.,  selection  of  textbooks  and  other  instructional 
materials), schools are more likely to hire additional non-civil servant teachers.  Various 
school  committee-related activities appear to  have different  effects  on teacher hiring.  
Schools that report student performance to their school committees tend to hire more 
teachers.  In  the  mean  time,  more  active  schools  committees  -  as  reflected  by  more 
frequently  reporting  of  committee  activities  to  parents;  or  more  school  committee 
meetings with parents and communities - seem to reduce the additional teacher hiring. 
Controlling for total enrollment, schools with fewer civil-service teachers do tend 
to hire more non-civil service teachers.  This shows that hiring additional teachers does 
have a compensatory effect, equalizing the student-teacher ratio across schools.  One 
interesting finding is that better teacher management and training is negatively associated 
with additional teacher hiring.  The results in Table 3 show that the share of teachers in 
schools  receiving  evaluations  from  the  principal,  and  the  share  of  teachers  receiving 
training  on  handling  classroom  discipline  issues  and  general  classroom  management, 
have significant and negative effects on additional teacher hiring.  This may reflect a 
quality-quantity trade-off of teachers.     20 
Table 2:1
st Step estimates: School decisions and intermediate outcome 




    bk08_as03E  T_nonPNS  Teacher_attend 
VARIABLES    coef  se  coef  se  coef  se 
               
Top down:               
_Ibk05_ao01a4  Dummy, =1 if very influential district/sub district over planning and 
allocating school's budget                               
4.201e+06**  (2.078e+06)  0.0878  (0.460)  3.702  (3.675) 
_Ibk05_ao01c3  Dummy, =1 if somewhat influential district/sub district over determining 
the content of teacher professional development 
1.647e+06  (2.357e+06)  -0.336  (0.523)  7.359*  (4.175) 
_Ibk05_ao01c4  Dummy, =1 if very influential district/sub district over determining the 
content of teacher professional development                               
-1.128e+06  (2.550e+06)  -0.352  (0.566)  9.723**  (4.518) 
_Ibk05_ao01d2  Dummy, =1 if little influential district/sub district  over selecting textbooks 
and instructional materials 
-2.088e+06  (1.870e+06)  0.592  (0.415)  -5.588*  (3.312) 
_Ibk05_ao01d3  Dummy, =1 if somewhat influential district/sub district  over selecting 
textbooks and instructional materials 
-1.340e+06  (1.719e+06)  0.680*  (0.381)  -2.998  (3.045) 
_Ibk05_ao01d4  Dummy, =1 if very influential district/sub district  over selecting textbooks 
and instructional materials                               
-1.403e+06  (2.052e+06)  0.868*  (0.456)  -6.011*  (3.636) 
bk05_ao03x  Dummy, =1 if principal have attended a meeting with the district education 
office staff 





           
_Ibk05_ks03a1  Dummy, =1 if the roles of school committee is to provide inputs in the 
allocation of BOS funds 
2.172e+06  (1.534e+06)  -0.254  (0.340)  4.795*  (2.718) 
bk05_pt07A  Dummy, =1 if school send all parents written information about school 
performance 
-706,430  (1.274e+06)  0.377  (0.283)  -
6.539*** 
(2.256) 
bk05_pt07B  Dummy, =1 if school send all parents written information about use of BOS 
funds 
2.432e+06*  (1.450e+06)  0.00623  (0.321)  0.712  (2.566) 
bk05_pt07C  Dummy, =1 if school send all parents written information about school 
committee activities 
1.637e+06  (1.488e+06)  -0.565*  (0.330)  1.829  (2.637) 
bk06_ks20A  Dummy, =1 if School Committee received information on the school's 
teachers and their performance 
-2.048e+06  (1.357e+06)  -0.0605  (0.300)  4.061*  (2.396) 
bk06_ks20B  Dummy, =1 if School Committee received information on students and 
their performance 
2.029e+06  (1.770e+06)  0.713*  (0.393)  -4.641  (3.137) 
age_chair  Age of School committee Chairman  -27,396  (57,469)  -0.0109  (0.0128)  0.207**  (0.102) 
D_edu_chair  Dummy, =1 if  School Committee Chair has education senior secondary or 
above 
2.158e+06*  (1.227e+06)  -0.0288  (0.272)  4.001*  (2.172) 
bk06_ks08xC  Dummy, =1 if School Committee held meetings with parents and/or 
community members 







           
 
bk08_as03R  School total budget  0.0141***  (0.00243)  9.13e-10*  (5.38e-10)  8.21e-
09* 
(4.29e-
09)   21 




    bk08_as03E  T_nonPNS  Teacher_attend 
VARIABLES    coef  se  coef  se  coef  se 
D_accredit  Dummy, =1 if school is accredited  -1.335e+06  (1.207e+06)  0.871***  (0.268)  2.312  (2.135) 
R_admission  Ratio of application / admission  -1.672e+06  (1.865e+06)  -0.343  (0.414)  2.797  (3.305) 
T_enroll  Total enrollment  38,275***  (6,037)  0.00757***  (0.00134)  -0.0151  (0.0107) 
T_PNS  Number of civil servant teachers   215,647  (179,504)  -0.170***  (0.0398)  0.213  (0.318) 
bk05_pc08B  Dummy, =1 if school receives assistance from District or sub-district 
education staff 
-899,001  (1.201e+06)  -0.176  (0.267)  3.522*  (2.128) 
bk05_pc08C  Dummy, =1 if school receives assistance from Private foundations/donors  -843,199  (3.343e+06)  1.179  (0.742)  -14.25**  (5.924) 
bk05_ao04G  Dummy, =1 if Principal received training for involving parents and 
community members in supporting the school 
-2.383e+06  (1.518e+06)  -0.119  (0.337)  6.273**  (2.686) 
Dfemale  Dummy, =1 if school principal is female  -1.256e+06  (1.190e+06)  -0.546**  (0.263)  2.689  (2.101) 
age  Principal’s age  -152,927  (116,072)  -0.0522**  (0.0256)  0.710***  (0.205) 
bk09_pj03a  Share of teachers receiving an oral performance evaluation from principal   -21,276  (2.255e+06)  -1.070**  (0.500)  1.370  (3.995) 
bk09_pj03b  Share of teachers receiving a written performance evaluation from principal  3.341e+06*  (1.943e+06)  0.0514  (0.431)  -1.043  (3.440) 
bk09_kg03xA  Share of teachers receive training from national government  -1.573e+06  (5.332e+06)  -0.405  (1.184)  16.64*  (9.447) 
bk09_kg03xB  Share of teachers receiving training province government  5.262e+06  (3.418e+06)  -0.0174  (0.758)  -15.17**  (6.047) 
bk09_kg03xC  Share of teachers receiving training from district or subdistrict Education 
Office 
-8.056e+06**  (3.318e+06)  -0.109  (0.736)  -1.566  (5.878) 
bk09_kg04A  Share of teachers receiving training in: Handling classroom management 
and discipline situations 
-3.902e+06  (4.124e+06)  -2.675***  (0.915)  -5.592  (7.306) 
bk09_kg04B  Share of teachers receiving training in: Planning lessons more effectively  -608,698  (4.981e+06)  -0.196  (1.105)  20.46**  (8.816) 
bk09_kg04D  Share of teachers receiving training in: Teaching your subject matter or 
grade level 
-1.471e+06  (4.483e+06)  1.650*  (0.995)  -3.291  (7.938) 
bk09_kg04H  Share of teachers receiving training in: Planning for the allocation of BOS 
funds 
4.733e+06  (4.499e+06)  0.224  (0.999)  15.51*  (7.970) 
 
Constant    -1.952e+06  (9.688e+06)  5.305**  (2.146)  42.88**  (17.12) 
               
 
Observations    383    384    384   
R-squared    0.627    0.346    0.287     22 
The teacher attendance rate also seems to be significantly affected by how much 
the district/subdistrict influences the schools.  However, the results show that a district’s 
―administrative  influence‖  (i.e.,  influence  on  school  planning  and  budgeting)  has  a 
positive effect, while its ―professional influence‖ (i.e., influence on textbook selection) 
seems to have a negative effect on teachers’ attendance rate.  The school committee 
appears to have a significant effect on teacher attendance.  We have found that schools 
with committees receiving teacher performance reports have significantly higher teacher 
attendance rates.  An experienced and better educated school committee chair is also 
associated with better teacher attendance
7.   
Table 3 presents the 2
nd step estimates of school outcomes
8.  Predicted values are 
used to capture the effect of school decisions and intermediate outcome s.  The results 
show  that  among  the  school  decision  and  intermediate  outcome  varia bles,  school 
spending on student activities, the number of non-civil service teachers, and the teacher 
attendance rate all have significant effect s on math scores, controlling for other school 
and parent characteristics.  In the meantime, only  the teacher attendance rate shows  a 
significant effect on language scores.   
Teacher quality and management stand out as important factor s in test scores. 
Both the share of teachers receiving training from districts or other sources, and the share 
of teachers receiving performance evaluations from principals have a significant effect on 
test scores.  One result that might be comforting is that the share of certified teachers is 
highly correlated with higher test scores, for both language and math.  This at least shows 
that the on-going teacher certification process does identify good teachers.  
The results also shows that whether a school is  a national standard school or an 
international standard school does not matter in terms of learning outcomes measured by 
test scores, and nor does the accreditation of a school.  This may indicate the weakness of 
one of most important aspect s  of the school quality assurance system in Indonesia.
                                                 
7 One puzzling result is that schools that send school performance report to parents seem to have lower 
teacher attendance.  But again, ―school performance‖ is not well defined in the survey.   
8 Full results of 2
nd step estimates are in Annex 3.   23 
 
Table 3: 2
nd step estimates: School outcome 
     Bahasa Indonesian Score  Math Score 
    Score_bin  score_mth 
VARIABLES    coef  se  coef  se 
D_standard2  Dummy, =1 if school is of Pilot National Standard  -2.793*  (1.674)  -0.386  (1.289) 
R_admission  Ratio of application / admission  1.773  (1.497)  2.183*  (1.151) 
T_enroll  Total enrollment  -0.0208**  (0.00820)  0.0240***  (0.00630) 
bk05_kr07  Principal annual Income (Rp)  6.06e-07**  (2.56e-07)  3.61e-07*  (1.97e-07) 
bk09_pj03b  Share of teachers receiving a written performance 
evaluation from principal 
3.028*  (1.584)  1.127  (1.218) 
bk09_kg03xC  Share of teachers receiving training from district or 
subdistrict Education Office 
3.360  (2.682)  3.605*  (2.062) 
bk09_kg03xD  Share of teachers receiving training from private foundation  5.258*  (3.142)  5.873**  (2.423) 
bk09_kg04E  Share of teachers receiving training in: Assessing the 
performance of your students 
1.563  (3.653)  4.918*  (2.819) 
bk09_kr12  Share of teachers certified  6.739**  (2.884)  5.276**  (2.226) 
exp_hat  Predicted value of school expenditure on students activities  1.91e-07  (1.16e-07)  2.35e-07***  (9.04e-08) 
nonPNS_hat  Predicted value of non-PNS teachers  0.912  (0.616)  0.903*  (0.478) 
T_attend_hat  Predicted value of teacher attendance  0.130*  (0.0733)  0.113**  (0.0564) 
           
Dedu_parent  Dummy, =1 if parental education at least senior secondary  8.387***  (1.847)  6.258***  (1.419) 
bk10_kr05  Parental annual income  1.57e-06***  (4.91e-07)  1.07e-07  (3.77e-07) 
Constant    17.08*  (8.842)  4.352  (6.784) 
            Observations    377    377    R-squared    0.425    0.368     24 
V. Conclusions 
The  global  trend  of  school-based  management  follows  the  principle  of 
decentralized decision-making, putting power in the hands of the frontline providers and 
parents to improve their schools, aiming at improving education beyond providing more 
classrooms, more teachers, and more textbooks.  The idea behind decentralized decision 
making and management is that the frontline providers and clients know best what they 
want, and what goes on in schools and other public service provision facilities.  
This paper examines the key aspects of the practices of school-based management 
currently in Indonesia, and its effect on education quality. Using a conceptual framework 
of an accountability system of public service delivery, this paper explores the relations 
among  parents,  school  committees,  schools,  and  government  education  supervisory 
bodies from three tenets: participation and voice; autonomy; and accountability.  The 
paper’s empirical approach allows a close examination of how these aspects affect school 
decision-making on key educational inputs, which significantly affect student learning 
outcomes.   
Using  the  data  from  a  nationally  representative  survey  of  about  400  public 
primary schools in Indonesia, the paper finds that the level of parental participation and 
voice  in  school  management  is  quite  low  in  Indonesia.    While  the  role  of  school 
committees  is  still  limited  to  community  relations,  school  facilities,  and  other 
administrative areas of schools, the school principal, together with teachers, is very much 
empowered to assert professional control of the school.  The most important finding of 
this paper is that the accountability system is very weak in Indonesia’s school system, 
which is reflected in inadequate information flow to parents, as well as seemingly low 
parental awareness of holding schools accountable.  The accountability arrangement of 
the Indonesian school system currently puts more emphasis on top-down supervision and 
monitoring.  Even though the interactions between district or subdistrct education offices 
and schools are generally frequent, the lack of rewards and sanctions for good or bad 
performance also leaves the system weak.  
The empirical work of this paper shows that although the scope of school-based 
management in Indonesia is limited today, it has begun to help schools make the right 
decisions on allocation of resources and hiring additional (non-civil servant) teachers, and   25 
to  create  an  enabling  environment  for  learning,  including  increasing  the  teacher 
attendance rate.  All these aspects are found to have significantly positive effects on 
student learning outcomes.   
The  results  of  this  paper  may  also  contribute  to  the  rethinking  of  teacher 
management reforms in Indonesia.  Hiring non-civil servant teachers by schools has been 
controversial as it is often perceived as inadequate spending and waste of resources given 
that the overall civil servant teachers are more than sufficient in numbers relative to the 
total number of students.  In the meantime, an increasing number of non-civil service 
teachers are queuing to become civil service teachers, creating pressure on expanding the 
size of the civil service.  The findings of this paper show that rather than in an ad hoc 
manner,  schools  do  hire  non-civil  service  teachers  in  compensation  for  the  smaller 
numbers  (relatively)  of  civil-service  teachers  at  school.    More  importantly,  non-civil 
service  teachers  contribute  significantly  to  student  learning.    We  argue  that  this 
contribution may not be because of the total number of teachers per se, as decreasing the 
student-pupil  ratio  from  20:1  (without  non-civil  service  teachers)  to  15:1  (with  civil 
service teachers) cannot provide a convincing explanation of the improvement of learning 
outcomes based on a vast amount of international experience.  Rather, non-civil service 
teachers may have very different characteristics from the current civil service teachers: 
they  are  generally  younger,  and  many  are  fresh  from  college,  and  with  updated 
knowledge.  They may be also more motivated to earn ―job security‖.  These hypotheses 
are yet to be tested.  
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Annex 1: Sample Summary Statistics 
        Variable  Definition  mean  s.e. 
Dependent variables: 
          
bk08_as03E  School budget allocation to student activities (school decision)  8.970e+06  (9.839e+06) 
T_nonPNS  Total number of non-civil service teachers (school decision)  3.491  (2.284) 
Teacher_attend  Teacher attendance rate (intermediate outcome)  94.93  (16.83) 
score_Bin  Bahasa Indonesian test score (school outcome)  45.48  (9.801) 
score_mth  Math test score (school outcome)  30.38  (6.807) 
 
Accountability: top down 
 
    _Ibk05_ao01_2  Dummy, =1 if little influential the district/sub district over drafting the school's work plan  0.131  (0.337) 
_Ibk05_ao01_3  Dummy, =1 if somewhat influential   0.475  (0.500) 
_Ibk05_ao01_4  Dummy, =1 if very influential                                   0.261  (0.440) 
_Ibk05_ao01a2  Dummy, =1 if little influential district/sub district over planning and allocating school's budget  0.172  (0.378) 
_Ibk05_ao01a3  Dummy, =1 if somewhat influential   0.352  (0.478) 
_Ibk05_ao01a4  Dummy, =1 if very influential                                   0.191  (0.393) 
_Ibk05_ao01b2  Dummy, =1 if little influential district/sub district  over assigning teachers to school  0.0836  (0.277) 
_Ibk05_ao01b3  Dummy, =1 if somewhat influential   0.324  (0.469) 
_Ibk05_ao01b4  Dummy, =1 if very influential                                   0.454  (0.499) 
_Ibk05_ao01c2  Dummy, =1 if little influential district/sub district over determining the content of teacher professional 
development  0.0888  (0.285) 
_Ibk05_ao01c3  Dummy, =1 if somewhat influential   0.501  (0.501) 
_Ibk05_ao01c4  Dummy, =1 if very influential                                   0.319  (0.467) 
_Ibk05_ao01d2  Dummy, =1 if little influential district/sub district  over selecting textbooks and instructional materials  0.185  (0.389) 
_Ibk05_ao01d3  Dummy, =1 if somewhat influential   0.379  (0.486) 
_Ibk05_ao01d4  Dummy, =1 if very influential                                   0.222  (0.416) 
bk05_ao03x  Dummy, =1 if principal have attended a meeting with the district education office staff  0.982  (0.134) 
 
Accountability: bottom up: 
 
    _Ibk05_ks03_1  Dummy, =1 if the roles of school committee is to approve  policies and make final decisions about 
how the school operates  0.770  (0.421)   30 
        Variable  Definition  mean  s.e. 
_Ibk05_ks03a1  Dummy, =1 if the roles of school committee is to provide inputs in the allocation of BOS funds  0.846  (0.361) 
bk05_pt01A  Number of times principal received monitoring visit by school Committee member  2.728  (3.645) 
bk05_pt01B  Number of times principal received monitoring visit by district or sub-district education supervisor  5.778  (5.002) 
bk05_pt07A  Dummy, =1 if school send all parents written information about school performance  0.298  (0.458) 
bk05_pt07B  Dummy, =1 if school send all parents written information about use of BOS funds  0.230  (0.421) 
bk05_pt07C  Dummy, =1 if school send all parents written information about school committee activities  0.225  (0.418) 
bk05_pt07D  Dummy, =1 if school send all parents written information about school and/or student activities  0.517  (0.500) 
bk05_kt02A  Dummy, =1 if there is pressure from parents to improve student performance in this school   0.606  (0.489) 
D_parent_schlmgmt  Whether parents reps are on school management team  0.345  (0.476) 
D_satisfied_schl  Share of parents satisfied or very satisfied on school quality  0.901  (0.152) 
D_satisfied_teacher  Share of parents satisfied or very satisfied on teacher  0.932  (0.120) 
D_satisfied_mgmt  Share parents satisfied or very satisfied on management  0.913  (0.146) 
D_multiple_schl  Share of parents applied multiple schools  0.103  (0.171) 
bk10_kt01x  Share of parents with multiple schools in village  0.276  (0.371) 
bk06_ks20A  Dummy, =1 if School Committee received information on the school's teachers and their performance  0.595  (0.491) 
bk06_ks20B  Dummy, =1 if School Committee received information on students and their performance  0.804  (0.397) 
bk06_ks20C  Dummy, =1 if School Committee received information on school's expenditures  0.640  (0.481) 
bk06_ks20D  Dummy, =1 if School Committee received information on curriculum, instruction and academic 
programs  0.488  (0.501) 
bk06_ks20E  Dummy, =1 if School Committee received information on extracurricular activities  0.663  (0.473) 
bk06_ks20F  Dummy, =1 if School Committee received information on school's facilities  0.791  (0.407) 
age_chair  Age of School committee Chairman  49.65  (9.616) 
D_edu_chair  Dummy, =1 if  School Committee Chair has education senior secondary or above  0.308  (0.462) 
bk06_ks08xC  Dummy, =1 if School Committee held meetings with parents and/or community members  0.736  (0.441) 
 
School characteristics and capacity: 
 
    bk08_as03R  School total budget  2.858e+08  (3.015e+08) 
   
        0.0679  (0.252) 
    0.133  (0.340) 
    0.00522  (0.0722)   31 
        Variable  Definition  mean  s.e. 
D_accredit  Dummy, =1 if school is accredited  0.726  (0.447) 
R_admission  Ratio of application / admission  1.103  (0.313) 
T_enroll  Total enrollment  188.2  (133.7) 
T_PNS  Number of civil servant teachers   8.974  (4.944) 
T_days  Number of schools days in school year 2009-2010  239.3  (35.51) 
T_hours_mth  Number of hours of math learning per week for grade 5   5.574  (1.230) 
T_hours_Bin  Number of hours for Indonesian language learning per week for grade 5 for  5.574  (1.280) 
bk05_kr07  Principal annual Income (Rp)  4.135e+06  (1.837e+06) 
bk05_kr10a  Years of being principal (at this school)  3.901  (3.866) 
bk05_kr10b  Years being principal (at any school, including this school  7.862  (7.429) 
bk05_kr12  Dummy, =1 if principal is certified  0.522  (0.500) 
bk05_pc01  Dummy, =1 if school has a management team  0.590  (0.492) 
bk05_pc08A  Dummy, =1 if school receives assistance from province education staff in drafting the school work 
plan   0.209  (0.407) 
bk05_pc08B  Dummy, =1 if school receives assistance from District or sub-district education staff  0.645  (0.479) 
bk05_pc08C  Dummy, =1 if school receives assistance from Private foundations/donors  0.0261  (0.160) 
bk05_pc08D  Dummy, =1 if school receives assistance from Others  0.117  (0.322) 
bk05_ao04A  Dummy, =1 if Principal received training for developing school vision, mission, and/or goals  0.418  (0.494) 
bk05_ao04B  Dummy, =1 if Principal received training for developing/revising school's work plan  0.501  (0.501) 
bk05_ao04C  Dummy, =1 if Principal received training for guiding the development and evaluation ofthe school's 
curriculum  0.525  (0.500) 
bk05_ao04D  Dummy, =1 if Principal received training for implement BOS program and use of BOS funds  0.721  (0.449) 
bk05_ao04E  Dummy, =1 if Principal received training for Planning and managing school budgets and finances  0.522  (0.500) 
bk05_ao04F  Dummy, =1 if Principal received training for supervising and evaluating teachers  0.501  (0.501) 
bk05_ao04G  Dummy, =1 if Principal received training for involving parents and community members in 
supporting the school  0.321  (0.468) 
bk05_ao04H  Dummy, =1 if Principal received training for working with the School Committee  0.462  (0.499) 
bk05_pt05B  Frequency of principal meet with teachers to discuss student performance  4.303  (1.145) 
Dfemale  Dummy, =1 if school principal is female  0.337  (0.473) 
age  Principal’s age  51.08  (5.418) 
bk09_pj03a  Share of teachers receiving an oral performance evaluation from principal   0.635  (0.245) 
bk09_pj03b  Share of teachers receiving a written performance evaluation from principal  0.486  (0.289) 
bk09_kg03xA  Share of teachers receive training from national government  0.0631  (0.109) 
bk09_kg03xB  Share of teachers receiving training province government  0.152  (0.177) 
bk09_kg03xC  Share of teachers receiving training from district or subdistrict Education Office  0.349  (0.263)   32 
        Variable  Definition  mean  s.e. 
bk09_kg03xD  Share of teachers receiving training from private foundation  0.123  (0.172) 
bk09_kg03xE  Share of teachers receiving training from KKG or MGMP  0.0383  (0.0956) 
bk09_kg04A  Share of teachers receiving training in: Handling classroom management and discipline situations  0.232  (0.208) 
bk09_kg04B  Share of teachers receiving training in: Planning lessons more effectively  0.408  (0.268) 
bk09_kg04C  Share of teachers receiving training in: Using a variety of instructional methods  0.398  (0.274) 
bk09_kg04D  Share of teachers receiving training in: Teaching your subject matter or grade level  0.361  (0.260) 
bk09_kg04E  Share of teachers receiving training in: Assessing the performance of your students  0.336  (0.244) 
bk09_kg04F  Share of teachers receiving training in: Assessing school needs and setting school goals  0.203  (0.192) 
bk09_kg04G  Share of teachers receiving training in: Preparing the school's work plan  0.211  (0.191) 
bk09_kg04H  Share of teachers receiving training in: Planning for the allocation of BOS funds  0.141  (0.157) 
bk09_kr12  Share of teachers certified  0.134  (0.182) 
 
Parental background;  
 
    Dedu_parent  Dummy, =1 if parental education at least senior secondary  0.315  (0.275) 
bk10_kr05  Parental annual income  1.378e+06  (988,208) 
   
    Observations    383 
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Annex 2.  1
st Step estimates: School decisions and intermediate outcome (full 
results of Table 2) 
   Expenditure on student  Number of non-PNS teachers  Teacher attendance rate 
 
bk08_as03E  T_nonPNS  Teacher_attend 
VARIABLES  coef  se  coef  se  coef  se 
 
Top down  
_Ibk05_ao01_2  787,390  (2.303e+06)  0.332  (0.511)  1.838  (4.078) 
_Ibk05_ao01_3  -243,974  (2.025e+06)  0.495  (0.450)  -3.683  (3.588) 
_Ibk05_ao01_4  2.025e+06  (2.215e+06)  -0.322  (0.491)  1.057  (3.921) 
_Ibk05_ao01a2  669,106  (1.945e+06)  -0.326  (0.431)  1.295  (3.439) 
_Ibk05_ao01a3  -671,492  (1.771e+06)  -0.126  (0.393)  2.251  (3.137) 
_Ibk05_ao01a4  4.201e+06**  (2.078e+06)  0.0878  (0.460)  3.702  (3.675) 
_Ibk05_ao01b2  642,764  (2.382e+06)  -0.159  (0.529)  -0.698  (4.219) 
_Ibk05_ao01b3  1.506e+06  (1.888e+06)  -0.00788  (0.419)  -0.953  (3.346) 
_Ibk05_ao01b4  1.254e+06  (1.874e+06)  0.0188  (0.416)  -1.636  (3.321) 
_Ibk05_ao01c2  647,193  (2.757e+06)  -0.0428  (0.612)  0.466  (4.885) 
_Ibk05_ao01c3  1.647e+06  (2.357e+06)  -0.336  (0.523)  7.359*  (4.175) 
_Ibk05_ao01c4  -1.128e+06  (2.550e+06)  -0.352  (0.566)  9.723**  (4.518) 
_Ibk05_ao01d2  -2.088e+06  (1.870e+06)  0.592  (0.415)  -5.588*  (3.312) 
_Ibk05_ao01d3  -1.340e+06  (1.719e+06)  0.680*  (0.381)  -2.998  (3.045) 
_Ibk05_ao01d4  -1.403e+06  (2.052e+06)  0.868*  (0.456)  -6.011*  (3.636) 




            _Ibk05_ks03_1  524,778  (1.274e+06)  -0.124  (0.283)  -1.716  (2.255) 
_Ibk05_ks03a1  2.172e+06  (1.534e+06)  -0.254  (0.340)  4.795*  (2.718) 
bk05_pt01A  964.9  (160,086)  0.0441  (0.0355)  -0.255  (0.284) 
bk05_pt01B  -13,367  (109,077)  -0.0321  (0.0242)  0.291  (0.193) 
bk05_pt07A  -706,430  (1.274e+06)  0.377  (0.283)  -6.539***  (2.256) 
bk05_pt07B  2.432e+06*  (1.450e+06)  0.00623  (0.321)  0.712  (2.566) 
bk05_pt07C  1.637e+06  (1.488e+06)  -0.565*  (0.330)  1.829  (2.637) 
bk05_pt07D  430,782  (1.195e+06)  0.0874  (0.265)  -1.919  (2.116) 
bk05_kt02A  -22,930  (1.186e+06)  0.273  (0.263)  3.165  (2.102) 
D_parent_schlmgmt  -1.176e+06  (1.450e+06)  -0.0781  (0.322)  -1.970  (2.569) 
D_satisfied_schl  6.999e+06  (5.510e+06)  1.589  (1.220)  -15.21  (9.734) 
D_satisfied_teacher  -3.527e+06  (6.643e+06)  -1.267  (1.466)  -8.321  (11.70) 
D_satisfied_mgmt  -328,801  (4.930e+06)  0.413  (1.082)  8.663  (8.638) 
D_multiple_schl  587,110  (3.319e+06)  -0.776  (0.737)  -6.763  (5.881) 
bk10_kt01x  552,902  (1.584e+06)  0.0413  (0.351)  -2.860  (2.805) 
bk06_ks20A  -2.048e+06  (1.357e+06)  -0.0605  (0.300)  4.061*  (2.396) 
bk06_ks20B  2.029e+06  (1.770e+06)  0.713*  (0.393)  -4.641  (3.137) 
bk06_ks20C  -1.175e+06  (1.285e+06)  0.151  (0.285)  -2.067  (2.274) 
bk06_ks20D  442,438  (1.301e+06)  -0.177  (0.288)  0.148  (2.301) 
bk06_ks20E  301,364  (1.516e+06)  -0.00272  (0.333)  0.232  (2.658) 
bk06_ks20F  454,486  (1.751e+06)  0.231  (0.385)  -2.556  (3.071) 
age_chair  -27,396  (57,469)  -0.0109  (0.0128)  0.207**  (0.102) 
D_edu_chair  2.158e+06*  (1.227e+06)  -0.0288  (0.272)  4.001*  (2.172) 
bk06_ks08xC  -256,234  (1.333e+06)  -0.515*  (0.296)  3.624  (2.360) 
 
School characteristics 
and capacity:  
 
bk08_as03R  0.0141***  (0.00243)  9.13e-10*  (5.38e-10)  8.21e-09*  (4.29e-09) 
D_standard2  -631,119  (2.082e+06)  -0.256  (0.454)  2.243  (3.625) 
D_standard3  1.778e+06  (1.627e+06)  0.0206  (0.361)  4.234  (2.882)   34 
   Expenditure on student  Number of non-PNS teachers  Teacher attendance rate 
 
bk08_as03E  T_nonPNS  Teacher_attend 
VARIABLES  coef  se  coef  se  coef  se 
D_standard4  8.393e+06  (7.523e+06)  2.012  (1.670)  9.017  (13.33) 
D_accredit  -1.335e+06  (1.207e+06)  0.871***  (0.268)  2.312  (2.135) 
R_admission  -1.672e+06  (1.865e+06)  -0.343  (0.414)  2.797  (3.305) 
T_enroll  38,275***  (6,037)  0.00757***  (0.00134)  -0.0151  (0.0107) 
T_PNS  215,647  (179,504)  -0.170***  (0.0398)  0.213  (0.318) 
T_days  14,414  (16,341)  -0.00536  (0.00363)  0.0360  (0.0290) 
T_hours_mth  -662,914  (756,504)  0.178  (0.168)  -0.554  (1.340) 
T_hours_Bin  -37,975  (720,110)  -0.0545  (0.160)  0.00336  (1.275) 
bk05_kr07  -0.254  (0.321)  -1.06e-07  (7.13e-08)  2.80e-07  (5.69e-07) 
bk05_kr10a  185,117  (171,412)  0.0211  (0.0380)  -0.110  (0.303) 
bk05_kr10b  -135,374  (91,996)  -0.00309  (0.0204)  -0.117  (0.163) 
bk05_kr12  1.550e+06  (1.182e+06)  0.113  (0.262)  1.901  (2.092) 
bk05_pc01  -294,679  (1.411e+06)  0.342  (0.313)  -0.711  (2.500) 
bk05_pc08A  1.208e+06  (1.386e+06)  0.171  (0.307)  -2.395  (2.452) 
bk05_pc08B  -899,001  (1.201e+06)  -0.176  (0.267)  3.522*  (2.128) 
bk05_pc08C  -843,199  (3.343e+06)  1.179  (0.742)  -14.25**  (5.924) 
bk05_pc08D  -877,643  (1.648e+06)  0.161  (0.364)  -2.593  (2.905) 
bk05_ao04A  -1.363e+06  (1.248e+06)  -0.257  (0.277)  1.305  (2.209) 
bk05_ao04B  1.020e+06  (1.280e+06)  0.184  (0.284)  -0.527  (2.267) 
bk05_ao04C  1.404e+06  (1.449e+06)  0.178  (0.321)  -2.476  (2.564) 
bk05_ao04D  -2.033e+06  (1.507e+06)  -0.117  (0.335)  -0.375  (2.671) 
bk05_ao04E  895,680  (1.437e+06)  -0.156  (0.318)  -0.880  (2.540) 
bk05_ao04F  -403,219  (1.321e+06)  0.145  (0.293)  -1.318  (2.339) 
bk05_ao04G  -2.383e+06  (1.518e+06)  -0.119  (0.337)  6.273**  (2.686) 
bk05_ao04H  841,446  (1.405e+06)  0.168  (0.311)  -2.637  (2.482) 
bk05_pt05B  -56,911  (482,502)  -0.0798  (0.107)  0.582  (0.855) 
Dfemale  -1.256e+06  (1.190e+06)  -0.546**  (0.263)  2.689  (2.101) 
age  -152,927  (116,072)  -0.0522**  (0.0256)  0.710***  (0.205) 
bk09_pj03a  -21,276  (2.255e+06)  -1.070**  (0.500)  1.370  (3.995) 
bk09_pj03b  3.341e+06*  (1.943e+06)  0.0514  (0.431)  -1.043  (3.440) 
bk09_kg03xA  -1.573e+06  (5.332e+06)  -0.405  (1.184)  16.64*  (9.447) 
bk09_kg03xB  5.262e+06  (3.418e+06)  -0.0174  (0.758)  -15.17**  (6.047) 
bk09_kg03xC  -8.056e+06**  (3.318e+06)  -0.109  (0.736)  -1.566  (5.878) 
bk09_kg03xD  -4.497e+06  (3.939e+06)  -0.159  (0.873)  1.216  (6.971) 
bk09_kg03xE  7.402e+06  (6.085e+06)  -0.206  (1.350)  -6.187  (10.78) 
bk09_kg04A  -3.902e+06  (4.124e+06)  -2.675***  (0.915)  -5.592  (7.306) 
bk09_kg04B  -608,698  (4.981e+06)  -0.196  (1.105)  20.46**  (8.816) 
bk09_kg04C  4.044e+06  (4.796e+06)  -0.0553  (1.065)  -9.113  (8.497) 
bk09_kg04D  -1.471e+06  (4.483e+06)  1.650*  (0.995)  -3.291  (7.938) 
bk09_kg04E  -2.005e+06  (4.576e+06)  -0.548  (1.016)  1.433  (8.107) 
bk09_kg04F  1.134e+06  (4.660e+06)  0.256  (1.034)  1.337  (8.254) 
bk09_kg04G  4.753e+06  (4.579e+06)  0.975  (1.017)  -7.142  (8.113) 
bk09_kg04H  4.733e+06  (4.499e+06)  0.224  (0.999)  15.51*  (7.970) 
bk09_kr12  3.019e+06  (3.349e+06)  0.254  (0.743)  -5.410  (5.929) 
 
Constant  -1.952e+06  (9.688e+06)  5.305**  (2.146)  42.88**  (17.12) 
               





  R-squared  0.627     0.346     0.287      35 
Annex 3:  2
nd step estimates: School outcome (full results of Table 3) 
   Bahasa Indonesian Score  Math Score 
 
Score_bin  score_mth 
VARIABLES  coef  se  coef  se 
unitbudget  1.41e-07  (1.35e-07)  -5.12e-08  (1.04e-07) 
D_standard2  -2.793*  (1.674)  -0.386  (1.289) 
D_standard3  -1.699  (1.276)  -1.540  (0.981) 
D_standard4  -5.524  (6.161)  -5.062  (4.729) 
D_accredit  -1.110  (1.107)  -1.135  (0.852) 
R_admission  1.773  (1.497)  2.183*  (1.151) 
T_enroll  -0.0208**  (0.00820)  0.0240***  (0.00630) 
T_PNS  0.255  (0.189)  0.0529  (0.148) 
T_days  0.000524  (0.0126)  -0.00439  (0.00974) 
T_hours_mth 
   
0.329  (0.283) 
T_hours_Bin  -0.460  (0.344) 
    bk05_kr07  6.06e-07**  (2.56e-07)  3.61e-07*  (1.97e-07) 
bk05_kr10a  -0.0522  (0.131)  0.162  (0.100) 
bk05_kr10b  0.00402  (0.0730)  -0.0457  (0.0561) 
bk05_kr12  0.413  (0.983)  -0.105  (0.755) 
bk05_pc01  0.802  (0.879)  -0.293  (0.679) 
bk05_pc08A  -1.361  (1.114)  -0.797  (0.858) 
bk05_pc08B  0.314  (0.996)  -0.774  (0.765) 
bk05_pc08C  -2.952  (2.765)  -2.002  (2.128) 
bk05_pc08D  1.263  (1.275)  -1.046  (0.981) 
bk05_ao04A  -1.005  (1.005)  0.340  (0.773) 
bk05_ao04B  1.659  (1.012)  0.256  (0.781) 
bk05_ao04C  -0.447  (1.132)  0.172  (0.867) 
bk05_ao04D  0.264  (1.166)  0.609  (0.898) 
bk05_ao04E  -0.800  (1.150)  0.932  (0.882) 
bk05_ao04F  0.445  (1.031)  -0.181  (0.793) 
bk05_ao04G  -1.914  (1.271)  -1.245  (0.977) 
bk05_ao04H  0.412  (1.137)  -0.268  (0.874) 
bk05_pt05B  0.270  (0.378)  -0.0357  (0.291) 
Dfemale  0.752  (0.969)  1.156  (0.747) 
age  0.0321  (0.105)  0.0849  (0.0806) 
bk09_pj03a  -1.536  (1.867)  1.115  (1.435) 
bk09_pj03b  3.028*  (1.584)  1.127  (1.218) 
bk09_kg03xA  2.693  (4.312)  4.482  (3.316) 
bk09_kg03xB  -0.883  (3.014)  0.474  (2.317) 
bk09_kg03xC  3.360  (2.682)  3.605*  (2.062) 
bk09_kg03xD  5.258*  (3.142)  5.873**  (2.423) 
bk09_kg03xE  7.926  (5.597)  2.963  (4.307) 
bk09_kg04A  3.844  (3.650)  2.107  (2.804) 
bk09_kg04B  4.328  (4.106)  1.093  (3.157) 
bk09_kg04C  1.503  (3.812)  -0.985  (2.933) 
bk09_kg04D  -4.693  (3.529)  -2.666  (2.713) 
bk09_kg04E  1.563  (3.653)  4.918*  (2.819) 
bk09_kg04F  -1.062  (3.678)  -2.848  (2.840) 
bk09_kg04G  -5.829  (3.778)  -2.912  (2.905) 
bk09_kg04H  -0.861  (3.685)  -2.497  (2.833) 
bk09_kr12  6.739**  (2.884)  5.276**  (2.226) 
exp_hat  1.91e-07  (1.16e-07)  2.35e-07***  (9.04e-08) 
nonPNS_hat  0.912  (0.616)  0.903*  (0.478) 
T_attend_hat  0.130*  (0.0733)  0.113**  (0.0564) 
          Dedu_parent  8.387***  (1.847)  6.258***  (1.419) 
bk10_kr05  1.57e-06***  (4.91e-07)  1.07e-07  (3.77e-07) 
Constant  17.08*  (8.842)  4.352  (6.784) 
          Observations  377 
 
377 
  R-squared  0.425     0.368    